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DISCLOSURE STATEMENT OF AMICUS CURIAE  
INTERNET ASSOCIATION  
 
Amicus Curiae Internet Association is not a publicly held corporation, does 
not have a parent corporation, and has not issued stock.  Therefore, no publicly 
traded corporation owns ten percent or more of its stock.   
 None of the counsel for the parties in this litigation has authored this brief, in 
whole or in part.  Furthermore, no party, party’s counsel, or outside organization has 
funded the research, writing, preparation, or submission of this brief.   
/s/  Peter W. Homer  
          Peter W. Homer 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Amicus urges the Court to grant plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction 
and to strike down S.B. 7072 in its entirety.  For the reasons articulated in plaintiffs’ 
motion, with which Amicus agrees and fully supports, S.B. 7072 violates the First 
Amendment, is preempted by Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act, and 
is unconstitutionally vague.  Amicus writes separately to highlight the extreme 
practical problems, and especially grave legal defects, inherent in two particular 
provisions of S.B. 7072:  its mandate for “consistent” moderation, § 501.2041(2)(b), 
and its limitation on rule changes “more than once every 30 days,” § 501.2041(2)(c).   
While this brief focuses on these two provisions, Amicus also endorses plaintiffs’ 
view that S.B. 7072 is riddled with other fatal legal defects. 
Amicus’s members include online platforms through which users can share 
news and opinions, advertise goods, rate and review service businesses and vendors, 
search for housing, and interact with individuals around the globe.  Especially in a 
time when travel is restricted due to a global pandemic, these online services connect 
people with loved ones, friends, and colleagues in ways that are essential and that 
would otherwise not be possible.  In offering these and a myriad of other services, 
these providers adopt policies and employ a wide variety of techniques, often 
tailored to their particular purposes and audiences, to affect what sorts of content do 
and do not appear, or are or are not prominently highlighted and featured, on their 
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2 
platforms.  These techniques include a variety of curatorial and editorial policies, 
standards, and processes, as well as manual and automated mechanisms for filtering, 
screening, or otherwise preventing users from posting material that violates the 
provider’s content rules, often referred to as “[c]ommunity [s]tandards.”  Force v. 
Facebook, Inc., 934 F.3d 53, 59-60 & n.5 (2d Cir. 2019), cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 
2761 (2020).   
The content policies and community standards of Amicus’s members vary 
significantly depending on each platform’s functions and purposes, and may include, 
for example, prohibiting hate speech and bullying, requiring sellers to provide 
accurate information about their products, or penalizing users for artificially 
amplifying the significance of their posts (e.g., by using fake accounts to increase 
the number of times a post is “liked”).  See id. at 60.  Without the ability to prevent 
unwanted or offensive content, the services that Amicus’s members provide could 
become unsafe, unreliable, or unable to perform the functions on which their users, 
the public, and the global economy have come to rely.   
S.B. 7072 would fundamentally disrupt platform operators’ ability, and 
deeply infringe upon their rights, to develop and enforce standards for the content 
they disseminate, to organize and curate that content, to comment on or contextualize 
content, and to provide their audiences with an online experience consistent with 
their unique norms and standards.  S.B. 7072 mandates that providers moderate 
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content “in a consistent manner among its users on the platform.”  § 501.2041(2)(b).  
The sheer volume of internet content and number of users, however, make that 
standard impossible to satisfy.  The inherent ambiguity and subjectivity implicated 
by S.B. 7072’s “consistency” requirement means complying with the law is even 
more unworkable.  Faced with those practical realities, the only way to guarantee 
consistent content moderation—and thereby avoid significant penalties—would be 
to do no moderation at all.   
S.B. 7072 would also prevent platforms from changing their “user rules, 
terms, and agreements … more than once every 30 days.”  § 501.2041(2)(c).  That 
restriction would drastically hinder providers’ ability to move rapidly to moderate 
content in response to new developments and current events.  Indeed, providers’ 
recent responses to unforeseen events—from the COVID-19 pandemic to the coup 
in Myanmar—have highlighted the need to quickly develop and adjust moderation 
policies, sometimes through iterative processes.  S.B. 7072 would foreclose that 
essential flexibility.   
Both the consistency requirement and the 30-day freeze on rule changes (like 
S.B. 7072’s other content moderation provisions) violate providers’ fundamental 
First Amendment rights.  The Supreme Court has long recognized that the First 
Amendment protects the right to engage in “editorial control and judgment,” which 
prohibits the government from “[c]ompelling editors or publishers to publish that 
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which reason tells them should not be published.”  Miami Herald Publ’g. Co. v. 
Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 256, 258 (1974) (quotations omitted).  Yet S.B. 7072 
attempts to do just that.  Moreover, both provisions—along with the remainder of 
the law—are expressly and impliedly preempted by Section 230 of the 
Communications Decency Act, 47 U.S.C. § 230.  Congress enacted Section 230 to 
limit government regulation and to encourage providers to self-regulate content on 
their platforms.  By taking a diametrically opposite approach—intensively 
regulating providers’ efforts to moderate content for the benefit of their users—S.B. 
7072 both violates Section 230’s express ban on inconsistent state legislation and 
conflicts with Section 230’s core purposes.   
BACKGROUND 
Content moderation is integral to the vitality of online services and 
communities of all sizes.  It allows providers to protect their users and platforms 
from a range of attacks—from financial scams and hacking attempts to abuse, threats 
of violence, and graphic or obscene imagery.  It affords providers flexibility to tailor 
their standards to meet the needs of their community of users—which in turn allows 
diverse and engaging content to flourish.  And it allows providers to distinguish 
themselves from others and create unique communities of users.  Etsy, an online 
marketplace that connects sellers of unique and creative goods to buyers around the 
world, has a “zero tolerance policy for prohibited items, particularly those that 
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promote, support or glorify hatred, those that promote, support or glorify violence, 
or are unlawful,” which includes a community of sellers who “find inspiration, share 
knowledge, discuss ideas, and build relationships that help them grow their 
businesses.”1  Pinterest, an image-sharing and social media company, prohibits 
“antagonistic, explicit, false or misleading, harmful, hateful, or violent content or 
behavior” in order to serve its mission of “bring[ing] everyone the inspiration to 
create a life they love.”2  And Reddit’s content policy is intended to “shape[]” the 
“culture” of the “vast network of communities” that exist on the platform and ensure 
that “no community [is] used as a weapon” and all users “have an expectation of 
privacy and safety.”3  
To ensure that their platforms meet users’ needs, online services of every 
stripe have issued community standards prohibiting various forms of objectionable 
material from their websites.  Content posted to the internet reflects the complete 
spectrum of human expression—from informative articles, insightful commentary, 
and moving artwork to appalling content such as nonconsensual deepfake 
 
1   Prohibited Items Policy, ETSY, https://www.etsy.com/legal/prohibited/; 
Community Policy, ETSY, https://www.etsy.com/legal/community/.  
2   Community Guidelines, PINTEREST, https://policy.pinterest.com/en/
community-guidelines.  
3   Reddit Content Policy, REDDIT, https://www.redditinc.com/policies/content-
policy.  
Case 4:21-cv-00220-RH-MAF   Document 77-2   Filed 06/14/21   Page 16 of 48
6 
pornography,4 vigilante groups initiating manhunts,5 and gender- and race-based 
harassment.  Many providers have determined that allowing objectionable or 
harmful content to appear on their platforms would degrade the quality of their 
platforms.  Common examples of material prohibited by community policies include 
abusive imagery, incitements to violence, fraudulent schemes, virulent hate speech, 
material that advertises the sale of illegal goods and services, misleading commercial 
content, and content that endangers or exploits minors.6   
Beyond these very common prohibitions, community standards reflect the 
diversity of the internet itself, with different platforms adopting standards 
specifically tailored to the platform’s business and purposes and the preferences or 
 
4   See Nguyen, The Students and Stans Saving K-pop Idols from Deepfake Porn, 
VICE (June 2, 2021), https://i-d.vice.com/en_uk/article/k78zzy/k-pop-deepfake-
porn-idols-cyber-investigation.  
5   See Cox & Koebler, ‘FIND THIS F---’: Inside Citizen’s Dangerous Effort to 
Cash In On Vigilantism, VICE (May 27, 2021), https://www.vice.com/en/article/
y3dpyw/inside-crime-app-citizen-vigilante.  
6   See, e.g., The Twitter Rules, TWITTER, https://help.twitter.com/en/rules-and-
policies/twitter-rules; Community Guidelines, YOUTUBE, 
https://www.youtube.com/howyoutubeworks/policies/community-guidelines/
#community-guidelines; Community Standards, FACEBOOK, 
https://www.facebook.com/communitystandards/; Reddit Content Policy, REDDIT, 
https://www.redditinc.com/policies/content-policy; LinkedIn Professional 
Community Policies, LINKEDIN, https://www.linkedin.com/help/linkedin/answer/34
593/linkedin-professional-community-policies?lang=en; Policies and Guidelines, 
PINTEREST, https://policy.pinterest.com/en.  
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needs of its particular community of users.7  In order to tailor their platform to a 
particular community, some providers may disallow content that other providers 
would find acceptable.  For example, a family-oriented website might categorically 
prohibit violent or graphic content, while other providers might allow such content 
for educational or newsworthy purposes.8  Social network platforms might 
implement protections to prevent harassment of younger users given that such 
content can “have more of an emotional impact on minors.”9  Retail and rental 
platforms might prohibit users from posting inaccurate product information given 
the importance of buyers knowing what they are purchasing.10  Platforms that 
compile user reviews might prohibit users from posting anonymous or irrelevant 
reviews, or might prevent users from reviewing their own, friends’ or relatives’ 
businesses.11  And platforms frequented by influential figures might prohibit users 
 
7   E.g., Veitch Decl. ¶ 3 (“YouTube strives to be a community that fosters self-
expression on an array of topics as diverse as its user base, and to nurture a thriving 
creative and informational ecosystem.”); Pavlovic Decl. ¶ 6 (“Etsy prohibits certain 
types of items from our platform because they are inconsistent with Etsy’s values 
and ‘the spirit of Etsy,’ including items that are high risk, potentially harmful to our 
members, or unlawful.”).   
8   See Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Servs. Co., 1995 WL 323710, at *2-3 
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 24, 1995). 
9   Bullying and Harassment, Community Standards, FACEBOOK, 
https://www.facebook.com/communitystandards/bullying.  
10   Authenticity, Community Standards, AIRBNB, https://www.airbnb.com/trust/
standards.  
11   Content Guidelines, YELP, https://www.yelp.com/guidelines.  
Case 4:21-cv-00220-RH-MAF   Document 77-2   Filed 06/14/21   Page 18 of 48
8 
from misleadingly impersonating such figures, which could deceive other users or 
disrupt financial markets.12   
These sorts of community standards are essential to providers’ ability to offer 
secure, desirable, and functional services.  Without them, forums would become 
overrun with objectionable, abusive, or offensive content that swamps constructive 
speech and causes others to abandon the platform.  Indeed, past attempts by some 
providers to minimize content moderation have quickly been reversed for that very 
reason.13  Providers thus devote enormous resources to crafting and enforcing these 
community standards.14  Some providers have entire teams and expert consultants 
 
12   Platform Manipulation and Spam Policy, General Guidelines and Policies, 
TWITTER, https://help.twitter.com/en/rules-and-policies/platform-manipulation.  
13   See, e.g., Rainey, “Wikitorial” Pulled Due to Vandalism, L.A. Times (June 
21, 2005, 12:00 AM), https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-2005-jun-21-na-
wiki21-story.html (describing the Los Angeles Times’ attempt to launch a feature 
that allowed readers to post unmoderated content; editors “ordered the feature shut 
down” within days because “readers were flooding the site with inappropriate 
material”).  
14   E.g., Veitch Decl. ¶ 4 (explaining that “YouTube has always had policies that 
govern how people may use the service, including restrictions on the types of content 
that they may post,” and that [t]hese policies are designed and regularly updated to 
make YouTube a safer and more enjoyable place for users and creators”); Potts Decl. 
¶¶ 8, 10 (explaining that “Facebook has invested substantial resources to maintain a 
safe experience for its community” by “over many years develop[ing] robust policies 
and practices relating to content moderation”).  
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devoted to figuring out what their rules should be and where to draw the lines.15  And 
providers deploy even more resources to enforce their rules and standards, with 
many providers combining manual and automated review systems.  Many services 
allow users to flag potentially objectionable material, which is then manually 
reviewed by the provider.16  Some have dedicated teams that proactively monitor the 
platform; others deploy sophisticated algorithms to help identify and block 
objectionable content.17  At larger providers, the scale of these moderation 
operations requires a massive investment of resources.  YouTube and Facebook, for 
 
15   See, e.g., Van Zuylen-Wood, ‘Men Are Scum’: Inside Facebook’s War on 
Hate Speech, VANITY FAIR (Feb. 26, 2019), 
https://www.vanityfair.com/news/2019/02/men-are-scum-inside-facebook-war-on-
hate-speech; Developing Policies, YOUTUBE, https://www.youtube.com/
howyoutubeworks/policies/community-guidelines/#developing-policies.   
16   E.g., Reporting Inappropriate Content, YOUTUBE, https://support.
google.com/youtube/answer/2802027?hl=en&ref_topic=9387085 (describing the 
various procedures and options users have “to report content that they find 
inappropriate” for review). 
17   E.g., 15th Transparency Report: Increase in Proactive Enforcement on 
Accounts, TWITTER (Oct. 31 2019), https://blog.twitter.com/en_us/topics/company/
2019/twitter-transparency-report-2019 (noting that “more than 50% of Tweets 
[Twitter] take[s] action on for abuse are now proactively surfaced using 
technology”). 
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example, employ thousands of staff to review material and apply content-moderation 
policies.18   
While Amicus’s members may differ in precisely how they craft and enforce 
their community standards, they are uniform in their desire that their standards be 
fairly enforced.  Amicus’s members voluntarily go to great lengths to publish and 
explain to their users what content is and is not permitted.19  These standards are 
conveyed in clear language and are readily accessible on platforms’ websites.  And 
providers generally give warnings before permanently terminating access to a user’s 
account.  YouTube, for example, uses a “three strikes” policy, where a user receives 
a warning, but no penalty for the first detected violation.  After that one-time 
warning, three violations within the same 90-day period will result in permanent 
account suspension, preceded by a one-week suspension for the first strike, and a 
two-week suspension for the second strike (with occasional bypassing of the strike 
 
18   E.g., Thomas, Facebook Content Moderators Paid To Work from Home, BBC 
(Mar. 18, 2020), https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-51954968 (noting 
Facebook “has approximately 15,000 content moderators in the US”); Veitch Decl. 
¶ 6 (noting YouTube “has hired over 10,000 people who are responsible for 
moderating content on YouTube”).   
19   E.g., Veitch Decl. ¶ 9 & n.3 (explaining that YouTube’s “Community 
Guidelines provide clear, public-facing guidance on types of content not allowed on 
the platform” and that the company “communicate[s] [its] practices to all users 
through YouTube’s Community Guidelines”); Potts Decl. ¶ 13 (explaining that 
Facebook’s Community Standards “provide details about what content is not 
allowed on Facebook” and allow users to “see Facebook's policy rationale for 
prohibiting each category of content and examples”).    
Case 4:21-cv-00220-RH-MAF   Document 77-2   Filed 06/14/21   Page 21 of 48
11 
system for channels dedicated to violating policies or a single case of “severe” 
abuse).20  Many providers also voluntarily give users mechanisms to appeal their 
content-moderation decisions.21  These procedures are intended to promote clarity, 
transparency, and fairness while allowing online speech to thrive. 
ARGUMENT 
I. S.B. 7072’s Requirement For “Consistent” Moderation Is Impossible To 
Meet And Would Force Many Platforms To Curtail Their Beneficial 
Moderation Efforts 
S.B. 7072 provides:  “A social media platform must apply censorship, 
deplatforming, and shadow banning standards in a consistent manner among its users 
on the platform.”  § 501.2041(2)(b).  The Court should not be misled by the statute’s 
deceptively simple appeal to “consistency.”  In fact, this consistency requirement is 
impossible to satisfy and lacking in any understandable or objective definition.  If 
allowed to take effect, it would broadly stifle content moderation and make the 
platforms far less hospitable to the users and audiences platforms seek to attract. 
A. The Sheer Volume Of Content On Most Online Platforms Makes 
“Consistent” Moderation Impossible 
No matter how hard providers work to apply their standards fairly across the 
board, compliance with S.B. 7072’s consistency requirement would be virtually 
 
20   Community Guidelines Strike Basics, YOUTUBE, https://support.google.com/ 
youtube/answer/2802032?hl=en 
21   See, e.g., id.; Appealed Content, Transparency Center, FACEBOOK (Jun. 1, 
2021), https://transparency.fb.com/policies/improving/appealed-content-metric/.  
Case 4:21-cv-00220-RH-MAF   Document 77-2   Filed 06/14/21   Page 22 of 48
12 
impossible.  Courts have repeatedly recognized the difficulties platforms face 
moderating third-party content given the enormous volumes of content they carry.  
For example, in Domen v. Vimeo, Inc., 991 F.3d 66 (2d Cir. 2021), the Second 
Circuit recognized: “Given the massive amount of user-generated content available 
on interactive platforms, imperfect exercise of content-policing discretion does not, 
without more, suggest that enforcement of content policies was not done in good 
faith.”  Id. at 73.  The Fourth Circuit recognized this same reality in 1997, when the 
internet was still, relatively speaking, in its nascency:  “The amount of information 
communicated via interactive computer services is … staggering. … It would be 
impossible for service providers to screen each of their millions of postings for 
possible problems.”  Zeran v. America Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 331 (4th Cir. 
1997). 
The volume of content has skyrocketed since then.  On Google’s YouTube 
platform, for example, more than 500 hours of content are uploaded every minute—
or more than 720,000 hours each day.22  Facebook has more than a billion active 
users every day.23  And Twitter hosted, in 2020, more than 700 million Tweets about 
elections; more than 2 billion Tweets about sports, and more than 7,000 Tweets per 
 
22   YouTube for Press, YOUTUBE, https://blog.youtube/press/.  
23   Facebook Reports First Quarter 2021 Results, Investor Relations, FACEBOOK 
(Apr. 28, 2021), https://investor.fb.com/investor-news/press-release-details/
2021/Facebook-Reports-First-Quarter-2021-Results/default.aspx.  
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minute about television and movies.24  Even on “smaller” platforms, the amount of 
user-generated content is still staggering; for example, the real estate website Zillow 
featured 949,788 active listings in April 2021,25 the independent seller platform Etsy 
hosted more than 4.3 million sellers in 2020,26 and Reddit has more than 430 million 
monthly active users.27  And although the relative portion of potentially violative 
content is small, in absolute numbers it is very large.  In the first quarter of 2021, 
Facebook took action on 8.8 million pieces of content for bullying and harassment, 
5 million pieces of content for child nudity and sexual exploitation, 9 million pieces 
of content for terrorism, 9.8 million pieces of content for organized hate, and 1.3 
billion fake accounts.28   
There is simply no way for a platform to review every one of these posts to 
ensure consistent application of a platform’s rules or standards.  Providers often rely 
on other users to report community standards violations—but users inevitably report 
 
24   Spending 2020 Together on Twitter, Insights, TWITTER, 
https://blog.twitter.com/en_us/topics/insights/2020/spending-2020-together-on-
twitter.  
25   See Housing Data, Inventory, ZILLOW, https://www.zillow.com/
research/data/ (inventory Excel linked for download). 
26   Number of Active Etsy Sellers from 2012 to 2020, STATISTA (Mar. 11, 2021) 
https://www.statista.com/statistics/409374/etsy-active-sellers/.  
27   Dean, Reddit Usage and Growth Statistics, BACKLINKO (Feb. 25, 2021), 
https://backlinko.com/reddit-users.  
28   Community Standards Enforcement Report, Transparency Center, FACEBOOK 
(May 2021), https://transparency.fb.com/data/community-standards-enforcement/.  
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only a small fraction of all violations.  Some companies employ automated 
technology to flag as much violative content as they can, but automated tools lack 
the ability to discern context and sometimes fail to distinguish content that is 
welcome from content that violates community standards.  Nor are automated tools 
always capable of detecting and blocking unanticipated or new forms of abusive 
content.29  Even when users and technology flag possible violations, and even when 
platforms have clear standards and excellent training on their implementation, the 
standards are still subject to the human fallibility of the reviewer; no one person 
could possibly review every content violation, and different people may apply the 
same standard differently.  The only way to avoid those moderation shortfalls—and 
engage in “consistent” moderation—would be to avoid any moderation at all.   
B. “Consistency” Is Subjective And Elusive 
A second problem with S.B. 7072’s demand for “consistent” content 
moderation is that, at least in this context, what qualifies as “consistent” is highly 
nebulous.  As an initial matter, the Florida legislature did not even attempt to define 
the term.  Must a platform take precisely the same enforcement action against users 
who publish the same exact content or category of content, does a sliding scale apply, 
 
29   See Shenkman, et al., Do You See What I See? Capabilities and Limits of 
Automated Multimedia Content Analysis, Center for Democracy & Technology 
(May 20, 2021), https://cdt.org/insights/do-you-see-what-i-see-capabilities-and-
limits-of-automated-multimedia-content-analysis/.  
Case 4:21-cv-00220-RH-MAF   Document 77-2   Filed 06/14/21   Page 25 of 48
15 
or is there some other measure of consistency?  Must content moderation be perfectly 
consistent or is there some numerical formula (i.e., 95% consistent)?  Is there some 
objective standard of consistency (and if so, what?) or does a regulator’s subjective 
view of consistency govern?  The law answers none of these questions.    
However “consistent” might be interpreted, it would be very difficult, if not 
impossible, to apply any rule of consistency to activities and decisions that are as 
varied and subjective as organizing, contextualizing, moderating, and curating the 
unimaginably diverse types of content that are constantly disseminated through 
online platforms.  As with all human communication, context matters, and 
something that is offensive or hateful in one setting may be empowering or 
educational in another.  Any attempt to moderate has the potential to be deemed 
“inconsistent.”  
Providers, for instance, may generally prohibit nudity but choose to allow 
posts that depict, for example, nude ancient statues or nudity that educates users 
about breastfeeding or childbirth; users may generally avoid a platform that contains 
nudity in a sexual context, but the same users may appreciate educational or artistic 
nudity.  And what one person interprets as sexual may be purely artistic or 
educational for another.  In one real-life example, Facebook generally prohibits 
nudity, but it allows users to post images of breasts to increase awareness and 
community in the context of breast cancer or breastfeeding.  Facebook allows 
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mastectomy photos because “undergoing a mastectomy is a life-changing experience 
and … sharing photos can help raise awareness about breast cancer and support the 
men and women facing a diagnosis, undergoing treatment, or living with the scars 
of cancer.”30 Similarly, Facebook believes that “breastfeeding is natural and 
beautiful” and “it’s important for mothers to share their experiences with others on 
Facebook.”31  But it is not clear, under Florida’s law, whether creating exceptions 
for nudity related to breastfeeding or breast cancer would be considered not 
“consistent” and thereby subject a platform that made that reasonable choice to 
enforcement proceedings, penalties, and civil liability.   
II. Barring Platforms From Making Frequent Changes To Their 
Moderation Policies Would Prevent Them From Responding 
Constructively To Rapidly-Evolving Social Crises 
S.B. 7072’s prohibition of online platforms changing their “user rules, terms, 
and agreements ... more than once every 30 days,” § 501.2041(2)(c), would severely 
hinder their ability to react and adapt to new and unanticipated problems that may 
rapidly emerge on the internet, and thereby leave platforms incapable of 
appropriately protecting the wellbeing and safety of the communities they serve.  
 
30   See Subramanian, Facebook is Officially OK with (Some) Mastectomy 
Photos, TIME (June 13, 2013), https://newsfeed.time.com/2013/06/13/facebook-is-
officially-ok-with-some-mastectomy-photos/.  
31   See Does Facebook Allow Photos of Mothers Breastfeeding?, FACEBOOK, 
https://www.facebook.com/help/340974655932193.   
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Providers would also be prevented from efficiently responding to user or expert 
feedback on newly introduced policies—for example, when a new policy prohibits 
more speech than originally planned or has other unintended consequences.    
Online platforms must be able to act nimbly to adapt and respond to 
developments in this highly dynamic—and content-rich—space.  Online services 
often allow users to post and share news content and information about current 
events.  These services, however, are also sometimes used to post and share 
information about dangerous, illegal, or offensive activities—including information 
that could be used to coordinate dangerous plans or violent plots.  
These sorts of dynamic moderation practices—which greatly benefit users 
across the globe—would be rendered useless if laws were to limit the frequency with 
which online platforms may change their policies or practices.  Under S.B. 7072, 
each policy change would restart an arbitrary 30-day clock, freezing the entire set of 
policies in place; during that time, platforms could not respond to changing global 
conditions, user feedback, or crisis events.  And whenever any changes that were 
delayed by the law were ultimately made, a new 30-day freeze would then set in, 
again delaying changes to address other emerging problems.  The problematic cycle 
might never cease. 
The February 1, 2021 coup in Myanmar exemplifies the need for quick and 
nimble responses to rapidly changing conditions.  One day after the coup, Facebook 
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designated Myanmar a “temporary high-risk location” and announced that it would 
“remove ‘any calls to bring armaments’ and protect posts criticizing the country’s 
military.”32  On February 24, 2021, Facebook further updated its content-moderation 
policies in response to the coup, banning Myanmar’s military and “military-
controlled state and media entities from Facebook.”33  Facebook acted due to the 
“clear risk of future military-initiated violence,” “[o]ngoing violations by the 
military and military-linked accounts and Pages since the February 1 coup, including 
... content that violates [its] violence and incitement and coordinating harm policies, 
which [it] removed,” as well as the fact that “[t]he coup greatly increases the danger 
posed by the[se] [on-platform] [behaviors] ... and the likelihood that online threats 
could lead to harm offline.”  Facebook explained that it was “continuing to treat the 
situation in Myanmar as an emergency and ... remain[ed] focused on the safety of 
[its] community,” adding that it would “take additional measures if necessary to keep 
people safe.”34  Had it been in effect, S.B. 7072’s 30-day freeze might have 
 
32   Robertson, Facebook Designates Myanmar a ‘Temporary High-Risk 
Location’ After Coup, THE VERGE (Feb. 3, 2021), https://www.theverge.com/
2021/2/3/22264180/facebook-myanmar-coup-response-temporary-high-risk-
location; Purnell, After Myanmar Coup, Facebook Removes National Military TV 
Network’s Page, WALL STREET JOURNAL (Feb. 2, 2021), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/after-myanmar-coup-facebook-bans-national-
military-tv-networks-page-11612272870.     
33   Frankel, An Update on the Situation in Myanmar, FACEBOOK (Feb. 24, 2021), 
https://about.fb.com/news/2021/02/an-update-on-myanmar/.  
34   Id.  
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prevented Facebook from taking these steps to rapidly update its rules in response 
to a dynamic real-world crisis—a delay that might well have cost lives. 
Moreover, the need for online platforms to develop and modify their policies, 
sometimes through iterative processes reflecting their experience, is incompatible 
with S.B. 7072’s cyclical imposition of 30-day bans on policy changes.  In early 
2019, for example, YouTube began to adjust one of its algorithms to avoid 
recommending certain conspiracy-related videos that it deemed “borderline 
content.”  In all, it made more than 30 incremental changes to its formula for 
recommending videos between late January and early December 2019.35  Some 
platforms’ vast user bases, the complexity of their systems, and users’ creativity in 
evading platforms’ content-moderation efforts can make such iterative policy 
changes essential.  But platforms would not be permitted to take such steps if S.B. 
7072 were permitted to go into effect.   
The need for, and benefit of, rapid and iterative changes and adjustments to 
content-moderation policies and practices was illustrated again even more recently 
 
35   Newton, YouTube Says it Will Recommend Fewer Videos About Conspiracy 
Theories, THE VERGE (Jan. 25, 2019), https://www.theverge.com/
2019/1/25/18197301/youtube-algorithm-conspiracy-theories-misinformation; 
Alexander, YouTube Claims its Crackdown on Borderline Content is Actually 
Working, THE VERGE (Dec. 3, 2019), https://www.theverge.com/
2019/12/3/20992018/youtube-borderline-content-recommendation-algorithm-
news-authoritative-sources.  
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as platforms confronted the worldwide COVID-19 pandemic.  As the pandemic 
progressed in 2020, “YouTube updated its policies related to medical 
misinformation alone more than ten times.”  Veitch Decl. ¶ 21.  Similarly, Twitter 
first implemented a policy on COVID-19 misinformation very shortly after the 
pandemic began, and since then it repeatedly updated that policy and its methods for 
moderating the flow of COVID-19-related posts throughout the pandemic. 
 In January 2020, Twitter launched a #KnowTheFacts search prompt 
that would ensure that when users sought information about COVID-
19, they were “met with credible, authoritative information first.”36  In 
the United States, people who search for key terms on Twitter are 
directed to the dedicated website on coronavirus and COVID-19 
administered by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC).     
 On March 4, 2020, the search prompt was expanded globally.37  
 On March 16, 2020, Twitter announced new enforcement guidance, 
broadening its definition of harm to address content related to COVID-
19 that goes directly against guidance from authoritative sources of 
global and local public health information.  Twitter required individuals 
to remove violative Tweets in a variety of contexts with the goal of 
preventing offline harm.38 
 
36   Coronavirus: Staying Safe and Informed on Twitter, Launch of a New 
Dedicated #KnowTheFacts Search Prompt, TWITTER (Jan. 29, 2020), 
https://blog.twitter.com/en_us/topics/company/2020/covid-
19#misleadinginformationupdate.  
37   Coronavirus: Staying Safe and Informed on Twitter, Global Expansion of the 
COVID-19 Search Prompt, TWITTER (Mar. 4, 2020), https://blog.twitter.com/en_us/
topics/company/2020/covid-19.html#misleadinginformationupdate.  
38   An Update on Our Continuity Strategy During COVID-19, TWITTER (Mar. 16, 
2020; updated Apr. 1, 2020), https://blog.twitter.com/en_us/topics/company/2020/
An-update-on-our-continuity-strategy-during-COVID-19.  
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 On March 20, 2020, it announced that it had begun to verify accounts 
that provided credible COVID-19 updates.39   
 On April 2, 2020, Twitter published a new policy governing the 
permissible and restricted content of ads referencing COVID-19.40 
 Less than three weeks later, on April 22, 2020, Twitter announced that, 
“[g]oing forward and specific to COVID-19,” it might consider 
“unverified claims that have the potential to incite people to action, 
could lead to the destruction or damage of critical infrastructure, or 
cause widespread panic/social unrest” to be “in violation of [its] 
policies.”41   
 Again within less than three weeks, on May 11, 2020, Twitter further 
updated its content-moderation policy to “introduc[e] new labels and 
warning messages that will provide additional context and information 
on some Tweets containing disputed or misleading information related 
to COVID-19.42  A week later, on May 18, 2020, it added a new tab that 
“include[d] curated pages” on COVID-19.43 
 
39   Coronavirus: Staying Safe and Informed on Twitter, COVID-19 account 
verification, TWITTER (Mar. 20, 2020), https://blog.twitter.com/en_us/topics/
company/2020/covid-19.html#misleadinginformationupdate.  
40   Coronavirus: Staying Safe and Informed on Twitter, Our ads policy for 
COVID-19, TWITTER (Apr. 2, 2020), https://blog.twitter.com/en_us/topics/
company/2020/covid-19.html#misleadinginformationupdate. 
41   Coronavirus: Staying Safe and Informed on Twitter, Broadening our 
guidance on unverified claims, TWITTER (Apr. 22, 2020), https://blog.twitter.com/
en_us/topics/company/2020/covid-19.html#misleadinginformationupdate. 
42   Coronavirus: Staying Safe and Informed on Twitter, Updating our approach 
to misleading information, TWITTER (May 11, 2020), https://blog.twitter.com/en_us/
topics/company/2020/covid-19.html#misleadinginformationupdate.   
43   Coronavirus: Staying Safe and Informed on Twitter, COVID-19 tab in 
Explore, TWITTER (May 18, 2020), https://blog.twitter.com/en_us/topics/company/
2020/covid-19.html#misleadinginformationupdate.   
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 As vaccines became available to the public, Twitter announced in 
December 2020 that it would “prioritize the removal of the most 
harmful misleading information” surrounding vaccination.44 
 In March 2021, Twitter began “applying labels to Tweets that may 
contain misleading information about COVID-19 vaccines.”45 
As these examples of platforms’ rapidly evolving efforts to address public 
health challenges or other societal crises amply demonstrate, the freedom to alter 
course and revise policies in the face of changing circumstances allows online 
services to better protect their online communities, and the general public, in ways 
that best serve their specific communities.46 
III. S.B. 7072’s Consistency Requirement And Ban On Frequent Policy 
Changes Would Fundamentally And Deeply Violate Platform Operators’ 
First Amendment Rights 
The First Amendment precludes S.B. 7072’s consistency and 30-day no-rule-
change requirements.  As the Supreme Court held in Miami Herald Publishing Co. 
v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974), the First Amendment protects the right to engage 
 
44   Twitter Safety, COVID-19: Our Approach to Misleading Vaccine 
Information, TWITTER (Dec. 16, 2020), https://blog.twitter.com/en_us/topics/comp
any/2020/covid19-vaccine.  
45   Twitter Safety, Updates to Our Work on COVID-19 Vaccine Misinformation, 
TWITTER (Mar. 1, 2021), https://blog.twitter.com/en_us/topics/company/2021/upda
tes-to-our-work-on-covid-19-vaccine-misinformation.  Twitter also introduced a 
“strike system that determines when further enforcement action is necessary” and 
serve to “help educate the public on [its] policies.”  Id.   
46   See Douek, COVID-19 and Social Media Content Moderation, LAWFARE 
(Mar. 25, 2020), https://www.lawfareblog.com/covid-19-and-social-media-content-
moderation.  
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in “editorial control and judgment” over what third-party content to disseminate.  Id. 
at 258.  This right prohibits the government from “[c]ompelling editors or publishers 
to publish that which reason tells them should not be published.”  Id. at 256 
(quotations omitted).  And it applies not just to traditional publishers, editors, and 
bookkeepers, but to any private actor curating or providing a platform for content.  
See Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian, & Bisexual Grp., 515 U.S. 557, 566, 
575 (1995) (recognizing that parade organizers exercise the same “editorial control 
and judgment”).  
First Amendment protections are no less fundamental on the internet.  The 
Supreme Court has explicitly held that its “cases provide no basis for qualifying the 
level of First Amendment scrutiny that should be applied to this medium.”  Reno v. 
ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 870 (1997).  And for good reason:  as the Court explained in 
Reno, unlike broadcast media—which the government is allowed to regulate because 
of technological constraints limiting the number of available licensees—“the 
Internet can hardly be considered a ‘scarce’ expressive commodity.”  Id.  Rather, 
“[t]hrough the use of chat rooms, any person with a phone line can become a town 
crier ….  Through the use of Web pages, mail exploders, and newsgroups, the same 
individual can become a pamphleteer.”  Id.  Moreover, the internet is not owned 
exclusively by any particular provider or platform.  If a person’s content violates one 
platform’s community standards—or even most platforms’ community standards—
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the person still has many other ways to express that content on the internet, whether 
on an independent website or a platform with different standards.  Courts have 
accordingly held that the First Amendment fully protects the rights of online 
providers to decide what content to display and prioritize on their platforms.  See, 
e.g., Jian Zhang v. Baidu.com Inc., 10 F. Supp. 3d 433, 435 (S.D.N.Y. 2014); e-
ventures Worldwide, LLC v. Google, Inc., No. 14-cv-646, 2017 WL 2210029, at *4 
(M.D. Fla. Feb. 8, 2017).   
S.B. 7072 would vitiate platforms’ First Amendment right to engage in 
“editorial control and judgment”—which they exercise by developing and enforcing 
content-moderation policies.  The only way to try to achieve full consistency in 
content moderation would be for platforms to do much less moderation, or perhaps 
virtually none at all.  For example, a YouTube representative explained that the 
“‘consistency requirement’ would burden YouTube’s decisions to protect its 
communities from harm by removing violative videos quickly,” resulting in “a 
significantly higher proportion of content being available on YouTube that violates 
the Community Guidelines.”  Veitch Decl. ¶ 28. The 30-day freeze on rule changes 
would likewise trample providers’ First Amendment editorial rights.  Again, 
providers have described these effects: Etsy’s representative stated that the 30-day 
requirement “would prevent us from swiftly responding to new trends in the 
marketplace, a new law or judicial ruling, or regulatory requests from Federal and 
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state agencies (such as attempted sales of counterfeit goods, responding to bad actors 
taking advantage of a fast-moving news story, or sales of contraband).”  Pavlovic 
Decl. ¶ 14.   
Forcing online providers to host material that they would rather remove—
even if they may remove it after 30 days—would be a clear violation of their right 
to editorial discretion.  Indeed, “[w]henever … a State … compels [individuals] to 
voice ideas with which they disagree, it undermines [free speech’s many] ends.”  
Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cnty., & Mun. Emps., Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 2448, 2464 
(2018).  Compelled speech inflicts “additional damage” compared to speech 
restrictions because “individuals are coerced into betraying their convictions,” and 
“[f]orcing free and independent individuals to endorse ideas they find objectionable 
is always demeaning.”  Id.; see also W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 
624, 634 (1943).  Yet S.B. 7072 would, for cyclical periods of up to 30-days each,  
effectively compel online platforms to publish content that they deem offensive or 
otherwise inappropriate. 
IV. Congress Enacted Section 230 To Preempt Burdensome State Laws Like 
S.B. 7072, That Would Discourage Content Moderation  
Even beyond its First Amendment violations, S.B. 7072 is independently 
unlawful because it is both expressly and impliedly preempted by Section 230 of the 
Communications Decency Act.  Titled “Protection for private blocking and 
screening of offensive material,” Section 230 provides that “[n]o provider or user of 
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an interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any 
information provided by another information content provider” or “ held liable on 
account of,” as relevant here, “any action voluntarily taken in good faith to restrict 
access to or availability of material that the provider or user considers to be obscene, 
lewd, lascivious, filthy, excessively violent, harassing, or otherwise objectionable, 
whether or not such material is constitutionally protected.”  47 U.S.C. § 230(c).  In 
enacting this provision, Congress sought both to preserve the internet as a medium 
for free expression without heavy government regulation and to encourage internet 
platforms to self-regulate and police the types of content that became available on 
their sites.47  Moreover, Congress expressly preempted all state laws that are 
“inconsistent” with Section 230.  See id. § 230(e)(3). S.B. 7072 is also 
“[in]consistent with the structure and purpose” of Section 230 and is therefore 
implicitly preempted as well.  See Gade v. National Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass’n, 505 
U.S. 88, 98 (1992) (O’Connor, J., plurality op.) (citing Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. 
Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 51, (1987)), accord Boggs v. Boggs, 520 U.S. 833, 844 
(1997). 
 
47   Zeran, 129 F.3d at 330; see also Kosseff, The Gradual Erosion of the Law 
That Shaped the Internet: Section 230’s Evolution over Two Decades, 18 Colum. 
Sci. & Tech. L. Rev. 1 (2016) (explaining Section 230’s “twin goals” were 
promoting both internet “innovation and voluntary content moderation”).   
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A. Section 230 Preempts S.B. 7072, Which Extensively Regulates Online 
Services  
In enacting Section 230, Congress preempted state legislation that 
undermined its goal of “maintain[ing] the robust nature of Internet communication” 
by providing platforms immunity for nearly all content posted by third parties on 
their sites.  Zeran, 129 F.3d at 330; see also Doe v. Kik Interactive, Inc., 482 F. Supp. 
3d 1242, 1247 (S.D. Fla. 2020).  “Congress was concerned with any government 
actors—including the judicial system—burdening the growth of the internet” and 
therefore chose to confer immunity on providers and preempt contrary state and local 
legislation.48 
Section 230’s text and legislative history evidence this goal.  The preamble of 
the statute itself sets forth Congress’s finding that “the Internet and interactive 
computer services ‘have flourished, to the benefit of all Americans, with a minimum 
of government regulation.’” Zeran, 129 F.3d at 330 (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 230(a)(4)).  
Congress also explained that “it is ‘the policy of the United States ... to preserve the 
vibrant and competitive free market that presently exists for the Internet and other 
interactive computer services, unfettered by Federal or State 
regulation.’”  Id. (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 230(b)(2)).  And one of the bill’s cosponsors 
explained the “message” from Congress was that it “embrac[ed] this new 
 
48   Kosseff, Defending Section 230: The Value of Intermediary Immunity, 15 J. 
Tech. L. & Pol’y 123, 130-31 (2010). 
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technology” and “welcome[d] the opportunity for education and political discourse 
that it offers for all of us.”  141 Cong. Rec. 21,999, 22,045 (1995) (statement of Rep. 
Cox).  Section 230 sought to “help it along” by taking the “Government … out of 
the way and let[ting] parents and individuals control it rather than Government doing 
that job for us.”  Id.  In short, Congress did not want an “army of bureaucrats 
regulating the Internet.”  Id.  S.B. 7072, which enlists such an army, is preempted.   
Section 230’s drafters also understood that the quantity of content on the 
internet—which has far exceeded congressional expectations in 1996—counseled 
against allowing government internet regulation.  One Section 230 co-sponsor 
explained that platforms could not possibly “take the responsibility to edit out 
information that is going to be coming into them from all manner of sources….  We 
are talking about something that is far larger than our daily newspaper … [and] is 
going to be thousands of pages of information every day, and to have that imposition 
imposed on them is wrong.”  141 Cong. Rec. at 22,046 (statement of Rep. 
Goodlatte).  In light of the “obvious chilling effect” posed by online services’ 
potential tort liability for the “staggering” amount of content on their sites, 
“Congress considered the weight of the speech interests implicated and chose to 
immunize service providers” to disincentivize them from “severely restrict[ing] the 
number and type of messages posted.”  Zeran, 129 F.3d at 331. 
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Congress thus enacted Section 230 to encourage the growth of the internet—
an aspiration that has been an undeniable success.  The exponential growth of the 
internet and online services since 1996 has only reinforced Congress’s judgment that 
imposing liability on platforms for perceived content-moderation failures would 
seriously impair that success.  The scale and magnitude of the task of content 
moderation far exceeds anything Congress could have anticipated.  See supra pp.12-
13.  It would be impossible for internet services to provide users access to this vast 
sea of valuable content while simultaneously moderating it in accordance with 
government regulations and facing possible sanctions should they fail to do so.  
Moreover, permitting Florida and other states to enact distinct regulatory 
regimes governing online services would result in a complex and unworkable 
patchwork of varied and conflicting legal obligations.  Imagine Georgia were to 
enact the very same statute mandating consistency in moderation, but that Georgia 
and Florida courts had different ideas of what types of content moderation are 
consistent with one another.  Platforms’ content-moderation decisions in compliance 
with S.B. 7072 might violate the identical Georgia law, and vice versa.  Congress 
intended to avoid such a situation when it enacted Section 230, which expressly 
provides that “no liability may be imposed under any State or local law that is 
inconsistent with this section.”  47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(3).  If ever a change were to be 
made to this regime, Congress—not state legislatures—would be the appropriate 
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body to enact it.  But Section 230’s drafters clearly contemplated and rejected the 
possibility of state laws encroaching on platforms’ control over their site, stating that 
the “policy of the United States” is to keep the internet as “unfettered by Federal or 
State regulation.” Id. § 230(b)(2) (emphasis added).  To allow enforcement of S.B. 
7072 would fly in the face of Congress’s clear intent.49    
B. Section 230 Was Enacted To Encourage Online Services To Self-
Regulate Content On Their Platforms, But S.B. 7072 Would Prohibit 
Them From Doing So  
Congress enacted Section 230 in response to a 1995 New York state court 
decision holding online providers potentially liable for third-party content on their 
platforms.  See Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Servs. Co., 1995 WL 323710 (N.Y. 
Sup. Ct. May 24, 1995); see Force v. Facebook, Inc., 934 F.3d 53, 63-64 & n.16 (2d 
Cir. 2019).  In Stratton, the defendant online provider, Prodigy, operated a platform 
for two million users, each of whom could post content to its “bulletin boards.”  
Stratton, 1995 WL 323710, *1-2.  Prodigy held itself out as operating a “family 
 
49   Congress has reaffirmed its commitment to national uniformity when 
amending Section 230.  When enacting the Fight Online Sex Trafficking Act, 
Congress removed a proposed exception to Section 230 for state-law civil claims 
that had been included in the original bill.  That removal happened immediately after 
hearing testimony about the need to maintain a “uniform national policy,” rather 
than a “patchwork of 50 different laws.”  Online Sex Trafficking and the 
Communications Decency Act: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, 
et al. of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary (“CDA H. Comm. Hrg.”), 115th Cong., 1st 
Sess. 7, 9 (2017) (testimony of C. Cox & J. Kosseff); see also H.R. Rep. No. 115-
572, at 9-10 (2018) (describing the goal of avoiding a “patchwork of various state 
laws”). 
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oriented” website and, in pursuit of that goal, issued “content guidelines” and used 
screening software to remove offensive or objectionable content.  Id. at *2-3.  But 
Prodigy’s efforts to address problematic content backfired.  The New York court 
ruled that Prodigy could be liable for third-party content on its bulletin boards 
because, rather than allowing all messages, Prodigy had made “decisions as to 
content” by “actively utilizing technology and manpower to delete notes from its 
computer bulletin boards on the basis of offensiveness and bad taste.”  Id. at *4 
(citations and quotations omitted).  In short, Stratton held that online providers that 
voluntarily moderate some third-party content could be held liable for all content 
that remains, while providers who engage in no content moderation avoid liability 
entirely. 
The following year, Congress enacted Section 230 to reject the “massive 
disincentive” that the state court in Stratton had created for online providers to 
regulate content on their platforms.  141 Cong. Rec. at 22,045 (statement of Rep. 
Cox).  The legislation’s sponsors explained that “[o]ne of [its] specific purposes” 
was to overrule Stratton and instead immunize providers for “restrict[ing] access to 
objectionable material,” even if, like Prodigy, they did not manage to remove all of 
it.  H.R. Rep. No. 104-458, at 194 (1996) (Conf. Rep.).  Section 230 thus created a 
national regime that avoided the perverse incentives under Stratton, whereby only 
Case 4:21-cv-00220-RH-MAF   Document 77-2   Filed 06/14/21   Page 42 of 48
32 
those platforms that made efforts to engage in socially responsible content 
moderation could be held liable for third-party content on their sites.  
Section 230’s text reflects Congress’s goal of promoting self-regulation.  The 
statute recognizes, for example, that it was meant “to encourage the development of 
technologies which maximize user control over what information is received by 
individuals, families, and schools who use the Internet and other interactive 
computer devices.”  47 U.S.C. § 230(b)(3)); see also id. § 230(b)(4) (“It is the policy 
of the United States … to remove disincentives for the development and utilization 
of blocking and filtering technologies that empower parents to restrict their 
children’s access to objectionable or inappropriate online material”).  Given that 
clear expression of congressional intent, courts have recognized that Congress 
enacted Section 230 to “‘encourage service providers to self-regulate the 
dissemination of offensive material over their services.’” Bennett v. Google, LLC, 
882 F.3d 1163, 1164 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (quoting Zeran, 129 F.3d at 331); see also 
Attwood v. Clemons, No. 18-cv-38, 2021 WL 1020449, at *9 (N.D. Fla. Mar. 17, 
2021) (“Congress has chosen to allow private companies and private users to 
censor.”).  
Congress also explicitly granted platforms considerable latitude to make their 
own independent decisions regarding which content to host and which to moderate, 
instead of requiring them to adhere to a one-size-fits-all standard.  Section 230 
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broadly immunizes platforms from liability related to publishing third-party content, 
see 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1), as well as “any action voluntarily taken in good faith to 
restrict access to or availability of material that the provider or user considers to be 
obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, excessively violent, harassing, or otherwise 
objectionable, whether or not such material is constitutionally protected,” id. 
§ 230(c)(2) (emphasis added).  As the Second Circuit recently observed, by referring 
to content that the provider “considers to be” objectionable, rather than attempting 
to define objectionable content, the statutory text “[n]otably … grant[s] significant 
subjective discretion” to platforms to determine what content is “objectionable.”  
Domen, 991 F.3d at 72.   
Just as Congress intended, many platforms voluntarily engage in socially 
beneficial content moderation.50  And by allowing platforms to police themselves 
rather than having the government set their standards, platforms with different values 
and user bases may choose to employ distinct content-moderation approaches.51  
Under this free-market approach to content moderation, platforms “seek to please 
 
50   See Kosseff, 15 J. Tech. L. & Pol’y at 154-55 (surveying platforms’ 
prohibitions on offensive content).   
51   Id. at 153-55 (contrasting CNN’s terms of use with MySpace’s); see also 
Douek, supra n.46 (“trade-offs between accuracy, comprehensive enforcement and 
speed are inherent in every platform rule”).   
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their customers” and therefore “are more likely than courts to develop content 
standards that conform to basic community values.”52   
S.B. 7072 would turn this congressionally-mandated approach on its head.  As 
described above, supra pp.24-25, S.B. 7072 threatens to force providers to curtail 
and possibly even to abandon moderation efforts altogether.  Indeed, that is the only 
way to guarantee compliance with S.B. 7072’s “consistency” requirement, given the 
volume of content and variety of contexts in which it can be used.  See supra pp.12-
13.  Rather than encouraging varied approaches to content moderation, S.B. 7072 
would effectively mandate a uniform approach to content moderation: none.  That 
outcome is entirely inconsistent with Section 230’s “object and policy,” and S.B. 
7072 is therefore preempted.  See Gade, 505 U.S. at 98 (O’Connor, J., plurality op.).  
CONCLUSION 
 For the foregoing reasons, S.B. 7072’s mandate for “consistent” moderation 
and limitation on rule changes “more than once every 30 days” are unworkable, 
unconstitutional, and preempted by federal law.  Further, for the reasons articulated 
in plaintiffs’ motion, S.B. 7072 violates the First Amendment, is preempted by 
Section 230, and is unconstitutionally vague.  Amicus respectfully requests that the 
Court grant plaintiffs’ motion for preliminary injunction.   
 
 
52   Kosseff, 15 J. Tech. L. & Pol’y at 153.   
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